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SilentAir Hijacks Asian Telecom Networks to Intercept SMS 2FA Codes and Spy on Taiwanese Users

About 3 min read

**SilentAir, a newly uncovered espionage group, has been using compromised equipment inside Asian mobile operators to hijack signaling traffic and siphon SMS‑based two‑factor authentication (2FA) codes, primarily from users in Taiwan.** The operation, first detailed by Stockholm‑based telecom and cybersecurity firm Enea, shows how attackers can infiltrate the trusted inter‑operator network (IPX) that carries SS7 and Diameter messages, then reroute calls and texts to their own gear. The report says the group’s activity has been halted for the moment, but the compromised infrastructure remains in place and could be reactivated.
Enea identified the threat as “SilentAir” after tracing anomalous signaling traffic to at least six Asian nations. While the firm judges the actors to be state‑level with high confidence, it only assigns low confidence to a direct link with China. The company has already warned the affected operators of the intrusion; however, it does not confirm whether those carriers have fully removed the malicious hardware.
The attackers exploited the core signaling protocols that mobile networks use to locate subscribers. By injecting an UpdateLocation request—or its Diameter counterpart—into the IPX, SilentAir falsely claimed that its compromised equipment was now serving the target’s handset. If the home network accepted the spoofed update, all subsequent voice and SMS traffic for that subscriber would be diverted to the attackers’ equipment, effectively giving them a man‑in‑the‑middle position on the victim’s communications.
Enea’s monitoring showed that a portion of these diversions succeeded. In several cases, the group intercepted 2FA codes within seconds of the diversion taking effect, indicating an immediate attempt to breach accounts linked to the compromised phone numbers. Intercepted traffic accounted for 18.3 % of SilentAir’s observed attacks—far higher than the 2.1 % share typical of other surveillance‑focused firms in earlier studies. The report found no comparable evidence of voice‑call interception or of any accounts being fully taken over.
SilentAir Hijacks Asian Telecom Networks to Intercept SMS 2FA Codes and Spy on Taiwanese Users
The victims included political and governmental figures in their own countries, and on rare occasions equipment in multiple nations coordinated against the same high‑value target, suggesting a single controller overseeing the campaign. Attack bursts varied dramatically, ranging from a handful of subscribers to several thousand within a month, followed by idle periods that could stretch for many months. While Taiwan was the primary focus, the group also targeted users on other Southeast and East Asian networks and, intermittently, on networks in East Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Enea could not determine whether subscribers of the compromised operators themselves were also affected.
Enea first noticed the intrusion by analyzing unusual SS7 and occasional Diameter traffic originating from operators that historically did not generate such attacks. The investigation, which began in early 2025, uncovered irregular handling of follow‑up messages for diverted users. Initially, analysts considered the possibility of external actors spoofing network addresses, but later evidence of equipment inside a carrier both sending and receiving attack commands confirmed internal compromise. The attackers’ deep knowledge of mobile‑network defenses made detection and blocking especially difficult until the intrusion was contained.
In parallel with the diversion attacks, SilentAir dispatched a massive volume of “silent SMS”—messages that do not trigger a notification or appear on the handset. During daylight hours, most silent texts were sent to subscribers on other Southeast Asian networks, apparently to verify whether a diversion was active. At night, the bulk of silent SMS targeted Taiwanese users; the timing aligns with periods when phones are least likely to re‑register to their true location, suggesting a check that earlier diversions remained in place. The messages themselves carried English‑language motivational or promotional phrasing, likely serving as a disguise; if any carrier stripped the silent flag, the recipient would simply see spam.
The report offers a low‑confidence attribution to China based on several observations: SilentAir’s focus on Taiwan, the absence of attacks on Chinese networks or users, and a work‑day schedule that mirrors China Standard Time (UTC+8), with activity beginning around 9 a.m., tapering off on weekends, and pausing around Chinese holidays. Analysts also examined a possible connection to the previously identified Liminal Panda group, which has carried out similar telecom intrusions.

Source: The Hacker News · Cybersecurity

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